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Abstract
Category-specific semantic deficits refer to the inability to
name objects from a particular category while the naming of
words outside that category remains relatively unimpaired.
We suggest that such semantic deficits arise from the
random lesioning of a unified semantic network in which
internal category representations reflect the variability of
the categories themselves. This is demonstrated by lesioning
networks that have learned to categorize butterflies and
chairs. The model shows category-specific semantic deficits
of the narrower  category (butterfly) with the occasional
reverse semantic deficits of the relatively broader category
(chair) .
Introduction
Category-specific semantic deficits refer to the inability
to name objects from a particular category as a result of
neurological damage. The naming of objects outside the
impaired category is relatively well preserved. Perhaps the
most striking category-specific semantic deficit is the
dissociation found between animate vs. inanimate objects.
In general, naming of inanimate objects is found to be
better preserved than naming of animate objects
(Warrington and Shallice, 1984; Silveri & Gainotti, 1989;
Gainotti & Silveri, 1996; Sartori & job, 1988; Funnell &
Sheridan, 1992; Farah, Meyer, & McMullen, 1996).
However, for a small number of patients, the naming of
animate objects is better preserved (Warrington &
McCarthy, 1987; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991, Sacchett &
Humphreys, 1992).
Warrington and Shallice (1984) have tried to explain
these findings by suggesting that words for animate and
inanimate objects are learned in different ways. Words for
animate objects are learned primarily though association
with perceptual cues because animate objects tend to be
described by their surface features (e.g., color, size).
However, words for inanimate objects are learned
primarily through association with the object’s function
because inanimate (man-made) objects tend to be
described by their use (e.g., a car is for driving). According
to this view, the naming dissociation does not reflect a
taxonomic ordering of semantic memory, but rather, the
differing proportion of the type of semantic features
(perceptual vs. functional) associated with a word.
Farah and McClelland (1991) explored this hypothesis
by constructing a connectionist model of semantic memory
and lesioning it. In this model, both animate and inanimate
words were associated with functional as well as perceptual
features. However, the proportion of functional and
perceptual features differed for animate and inanimate
words respectively. They found that by lesioning either the
perceptual or functional components of semantic memory,
animate or inanimate words were impaired respectively.
This was used to corroborate Warrington and Shallice’s
account of category-specific semantic deficits. Category-
specific semantic deficits arose even though words were
not stored with respect to semantic category.
While this is a plausible account of the source of
category-specific semantic deficits that does not appeal to
the prior taxonomic organization of semantic memory, it
still implies that there exists an intrinsic dissociation in the
way that functional and perceptual features are stored in
semantic memory. The Farah and McClelland model only
works because there are identifiable regions that encode
one or the other type of semantic information, and that can
be lesioned selectively. This account still relies on an a
priori structuring of semantic memory to explain the
observed semantic dissociation. The only difference is that
rather than positing an explicit taxonomic order, the
taxonomic ordering is mediated by a high correlation
between perceptual features with animate objects, and
functional features with inanimate objects.
The greatest shortcoming of the model is that it fails to
explain why damage should occur either (a) selectively to
the perceptual features (thereby preserving knowledge of
inanimate words) or (b) selectively to the functional
features (thereby preserving knowledge of animate
objects).
 Some evidence for separate perceptual or functional
memory damage comes from the neuropathologies
associated with category-specific semantic deficits.
Localized damage (e.g., from herpes encephalitis) to the
temporolimbic system (resulting in a loss of perceptual
features), or to the frontoparietal regions (resulting in a loss
of functional features have been associated with the loss of
one semantic category or the other (Saffran & Schwartz,
1988). However, category specific impairments have also
been found in patients with Alzheimer’s disease, a
widespread pathology, causing damage to both the
temporolimbic system and the frontoparietal regions.
(Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kempler, & Seidenberg,
in press; McKrae, De Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997; Silveri &
Gainotti, 1988). This sort pathology cannot be modelled by
selectively leasioning neurons in separate memories. One
would expect that the diffuse neural damage found in
Alzheimer’s patients with category-specific semantic
deficits would result in equal damage to perceptual and
functional features. Hence, even if inanimate words have
more functional features and animate words have more
perceptual features both categories would be equally
impaired by the random damage.
In this paper we present a connectionist model of
category-specific semantic deficits that does not assume an
initial partitioning of semantic memory along either a
taxonomic or a perceptual/functional divide. The model
posits a unified semantic memory in which all features are
treated equally (e.g., Caramazza, Hills, Rapp, & Romani,
1990). Category-specific semantic deficits arises from
random lesioning of the network. The model we propose
suggests that category-specific semantic deficits reflect
differences in the variability of features encoding both
animate and inanimate objects.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we
briefly present the pseudo-recurrent network architecture
developed by French (1997a) and used for modeling
semantic memory (French, 1997b). An explanation for
category-specific semantic deficits is then presented. The
next section illustrates this process by lesioning networks
that have been trained with two real world categories.
Finally, the likelihood of recovery from damage is
discussed.
Pseudo-Recurrent Connectionist Networks
The architecture discussed in this paper was first
developed by French (1997a) to overcome catastrophic
interference in backpropagation (BP) networks. It suggests
that catastrophic interference in memory can be overcome
by mixing in approximations of previously learned
patterns (“pseudopatterns” of Robins, 1995) with new
information during learning. Learning proceeds in two
stages. The first stage (which involves mixing new and old
information) takes place in an early-processing area of the
network. The second stage (which involves laying down
the new knowledge) takes place in the final-storage area.
This method is analogous to that used by McClelland,
McNaughton, and O’Reilly (1995) to model the exchange
of information between the hippocampus and the neocortex
involved in the laying down of memories. The shunting of
information between two memory systems is believed to
have evolved as a natural way of overcoming the problem
of catastrophic interference in a distributed system such as
the brain.
The network consists of a feedforward BP network that is
divided into two parts, one used to help train the other
(Figure 1). We will call the left-hand side of the network
the “early-processing memory” and the right-hand side the
“final-storage memory.”  It is perhaps easiest to explain
how the network works in terms of a specific example.
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Figure 1.  The pseudo-recurrent network architecture
Suppose that the “final-storage” area contains what the
network has learned up to the present time.  The network is
then asked to sequentially learn 20 new patterns, P1, P2, ...
P20. Each of these patterns, Pi, consists of an input and an
output (“teacher”) association: (Ii, Ti). By sequentially
learning these patterns we mean that each individual
pattern must be learned to criterion before the system can
begin to learn the subsequent pattern. To learn pattern P1,
its input I1 is presented to the network.  Activation flows
through both parts of the network, but the output from the
final-storage part is prevented from reaching the teacher
nodes by the “real” teacher T1.  In other words, the teacher
pattern T1 fills the teacher nodes. The early-processing
network then adjusts its weights with the standard
backpropagation algorithm using as the error signal the
difference between T1 and the output O1 of the early-
processing network.  Crucially, however, the early-
processing network does not only learn the pattern P1.
Internally created pseudopatterns, reflecting the contents of
final-storage, are also generated by the final-storage
memory and will be learned by the early-processing
memory along with P1.
Pseudopatterns are generated by final-storage and learned
by the early-processing memory as follows.  A random
input pattern, i1, is presented to the input nodes of the
system.  This input produces an output, o1, at the output
layer of the early-processing memory and also produces an
output, t1, on the teacher nodes of the final-storage
memory. This input-output pair (i1, t1) defines a
pseudopattern, ψ1, that reflects the contents of the final-
storage memory.  The difference between t1 and o1
determines the error signal for changing the weights in the
early-processing memory. Similarly, the other random
inputs, i2, i3, . . . in, produce pseudopatterns, ψ2, ψ3, . . . ψn
that are also be learned by the early-processing memory.
Once the weight changes have been made for the first
epoch for the set of patterns {P1, ψ1, ψ2, . . . ψn}, the early-
processing memory cycles through this set of patterns
again and again until it has learned them all to criterion.
By learning the pattern P1 the early-processing memory is
learning the new information presented to it; by learning
the pseudopatterns ψ1, . . ., ψn, the early-processing memory
is, in addition, learning an approximation of the
information previously stored in final storage.  Obviously,
the more pseudopatterns that are generated, the more
accurately they will reflect the contents of final storage.
Once learning in the early-processing network has
converged for P1, ψ1, ψ2, . . . ψn, the early-processing
weights then replace the final-storage weights.  In other
words, the early-processing memory becomes the final
storage memory and the network is ready to learn the next
pattern, P2.  (Note that this weight-copying strategy is
certainly not biologically plausible.  However, it has been
shown (French, 1997a) that information transfer can also
be effectively done from early-processing to final-storage
by means of the above type of pseudo-pattern transfer.
The essence of this technique is to interleave new
information to be learned with pseudopatterns that reflect
the contents of final-storage.  Thus, rather than interleaving
the real, originally learned patterns with the new input
coming to the early-processing memory, we do the next
best thing — namely, we interleave pseudopatterns that are
approximations of the previously stored patterns.  Once the
new pattern and the pseudopatterns are learned in the
early-processing area, the weights from the early-
processing network are copied to the corresponding
weights in the final-storage network (or, more plausibly,
the early-processing area trains the final-storage area using
its own set of pseudopatterns).
The model is called “pseudo-recurrent” not only because
of the recurrent nature of the training of the early-
processing memory by the final-storage memory —
approximations of previously learned information is
continually fed back into the early-processing area from
final-storage —, but also as a means of acknowledging the
all-important mechanism of information transfer from
final-storage to early-processing storage — namely,
pseudopatterns. During sequential learning, information is
continually passed back and forth between the two memory
areas by means of pseudopatterns.
One unanticipated result of this use of pseudo patterns is
the compression of the representations that develop in final
storage. This is illustrated for a particular example in
Figures 2 and 3, and discussed in more detail below.
Compression has numerous advantages. In particular, there
is a decrease in the number of resources required to
activate any given word, and a decrease in the amount of
overlap in final storage. Compact representations may,
presumably, allow for more efficient processing of
incoming stimuli because of their reduced demand on
system resources (i.e., less activation is required to fully
activate a compact representation. However, highly
compact representations are more vulnerable to selective
damage than highly distributed representations.
It is worth repeating that the pseudorecurrent architecture
is meant to capture the natural process by which the brain
may be overcoming catastrophic interference (McClelland,
McNaughton, and O’Reilly; 1995). The compression of
categorical representations is a processing by-product that
falls naturally out of the pseudo-recurrent mechanism.
A Mechanism for Category-Specific Loss
In contrast to explanations of category-specific semantic
deficits that rely on the perception/function distinction
(Warrington & Shallice, 1984; Durrant-Paetfield, Tyler,
Moss, & Levy, 1997; Farah & McClelland, 1991), we
suggest that this selective memory loss is due, at least in
part, to the considerable difference in the average
variability within most biological and artificial kinds.  This
difference, is combined with the phenomenon of gradual
compression of representations as they are consolidated in
final-storage — making them increasingly susceptible to
damage.
When two real-world categories that have very different
variance are stored in a network — connectionist or human
— the difference in variance will be reflected in a
difference in the variance of the internal representations of
the two categories. The greater the variance in the real-
world category, the greater the variance in the internal
representation of that category, where the variance of an
internal representation is determined by the “spread” of the
distribution of the hidden-unit activation pattern
corresponding to a representation when it is activated.
The more compact the distribution (i.e., the lower the
variance) the more vulnerable the category is to
catastrophic damage. This is because the loss of one or two
nodes in a narrowly defined category corresponds to a
greater proportional loss of information. This is true in any
distributed connectionist network. The pseudo-recurrent
network enhances this effect by effectively reducing the
number of nodes participating in the representations. We
explore this account further by training a pseudorecurrent
network with two categories: one artificial (CHAIR) and
the other natural (BUTTERFLY).
Animate vs. Inanimate Semantic
Dissociations
Twenty standard Backpropagation (BP) and 20 pseudo-
recurrent networks with 13 input units, 13 output units, and
32 hidden units each were trained to autoassociate 20
examples of both butterflies and tables (for a total of 40
tokens). The parameter training values were as follows:
initial weight range: [–2, 2], learning rate: 0.1, momentum:
0.9, and Fahlman offset: 0.1. The pseudo-recurrent
networks used 15 pseudo-patterns in learning.
The categories of CHAIR and BUTTERFLY were chosen
because they were familiar categories with extremely high
naming reliability (100% for both) and very similar image
agreements (chair: 3.22 and butterfly: 3.92) according to
the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) picture naming data.
Subjects recognize these categories easily and have
similarly well-defined mental images for both categories.
The 40 exemplars were coded along the following 13
dimensions: head-length, head width, eye separation,
antenna length, dominant colour, leg length, number of
legs, vertical extent, horizontal extent, number of angles,
material, surface incline, deformability. Measurements
were taken from randomly selected actual examples of
butterflies and chairs as detailed in Howarth (1973) and
Humphreys (1970) respectively.
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Figure 2. Hidden unit activation profile for Butterflies and
Chairs in a standard BP network.
Exemplars were selected randomly and were learned
sequentially: each exemplar was learned to criterion before
the next was presented. Training (autoassociation) was
stopped when all outputs were within 0.2 of their target or
after 1000 epochs of training. Figure 2 shows an example
of the internal representation developed across the hidden
units for the BUTTERFLY and CHAIR categories for the
standard BP network.
Both categories are encoded over the whole band of
hidden units. Presentation of a butterfly exemplar produces
activation on 28 out of 32 hidden units while presentation
of a chair produces activation on all 32 units.
Figure 3 shows the same internal representations for the
pseudo-recurrent networks trained with 15 pseudo-patterns.
These hidden unit representations are much more compact.
The BUTTERFLY category is only coded across 3 hidden
units while the CHAIR category is coded across 22 units.
As compared with the standard BP networks, there is a net
decrease in the variance of the internal representations of
both categories as measured by the number of units
required to encode them. It is worth noting that a loss in
information also accompanies this representational
compression. Although the pseudo-recurrent networks can
autoassociate as well as the standard BP networks, the finer
details of the exemplars are lost during the compression
process.
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Figure 3. Hidden unit activation profile for Butterflies and
Chairs in a network trained with 15 pseudopatterns.
To explore the robustness of these representations, the 40
networks were systematically lesioned by removing each of
the hidden units one at a time. There were 32 possible
lesions for each network for a total of 640 lesioning
instances. The systematic lesioning approach guarantees
that the whole space of possible damage is explored. Table
1 shows the proportion of networks having completely lost
the BUTTERFLY or CHAIR categories (but having
preserved the other category) for both standard BP and
pseudo-recurrent networks.
Table 1. Percentage of lesions resulting
in total category loss (n=640)
Standard BP Pseudorecurrent
CHAIR 0% 0.3%
BUTTERFLY 0% 3%
With standard BP none of the lesions resulted in total
category loss. The distributed representations are immune
to this type of lesioning. However category loss did appear
in a small but significant number of pseudo-recurrent
networks. Three percent of lesions resulted in the complete
loss of BUTTERFLY (while preserving CHAIR) and 0.3 %
resulted in the loss of CHAIR (while preserving
BUTTERFLY). The natural kind category was more likely
to be selectively lost than the artificial kind. However, it is
important to note that about 1/10th as many lesions resulted
in the opposite effect: the selective loss of the artificial
category. This is compatible with the finding that for a
small number of patients, the naming of animate objects is
better preserved (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Hillis &
Caramazza, 1991, Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992). Both
phenomena can be explained by appealing to the same
random damage and the different distribution
characteristics of the categories.
One implication of this approach is that relative category
loss can only be meaningfully evaluated between
categories that are at a similar taxonomic level. Basic
individual categories such as BUTTERFLY and CHAIR
would both be lost before superordinate categories such as
ANIMAL and FURNITURE because both the latter
categories have much more variation than either of the
basic level categories.
Recovery From Damage
Early in learning few pseudopatterns have been mixed in
with the categorical information. Each category remains
relatively broadly defined across the hidden units. As
learning progresses (as the network gets older and more
pseudo-patterns are mixed in) the categories become more
compact and more tightly defined. One implication is that
random damage early in learning (at a young age) will
produce general damage to all categories but is unlikely to
catastrophically damage any one category. Because no
category is eradicated, there is a much better chance that a
small amount of subsequent exposure to examples of that
category will produce a complete recovery of the category.
In contrast, older networks have narrowly defined,
relatively sparse category representations. As a result,
random damage is less likely to effect any of them.
However, if a category is damaged, it is more likely to be
catastrophically damaged and unable to recover with
subsequent exposure to examples of that category.
In short, young networks are more susceptible to minor
damage but can recover from the damage whereas older
networks are more resilient to damage but more brittle and
less able to recover from damage.
Discussion
In this paper we have presented a simple model of
category-specific semantic deficits. The model uses the
pseudorecurrent architecture devised by French (1997a).
Learning occurs by mixing in information already present
within a network with the new information before laying it
down in a network by using backpropagation. One result of
this process is that categorical representations become
more compact, less distributed, and more susceptible to
catastrophic damage. We suggest that such a mechanism
could account for a range of category-specific semantic
deficits.
The pseudorecurrent architecture was used to model the
category-specific semantic deficits observed between
animate and inanimate objects. This was illustrated by
training the network on one animate category
(BUTTERFLY) and one inanimate category (CHAIR).
After consolidation with pseudopatterns the networks were
exposed to random diffuse lesioning. There was a
predominant loss of the animate category (Butterfly) with a
small minority of networks showing the reverse effect of
losing the inanimate category. This closely matches what is
found with human patients. The present model does not
have to appeal to a structured semantic memory (for
example by positing taxonomic or percept/function
structures in memory) and is therefore more parsimonious
than previous models of semantic dissociation.
Minimal systematic lesioning was used to explore the
robustness of the category representations. Clearly,
increasing the amount of lesioning would increase the
amount of loss in both categories. An important
implication of the model is that category-specific semantic
deficits can occur even with minimal lesioning. However,
the large majority of individuals experiencing this type of
damage would not report any loss. This suggests that the
number of people having suffered damage may be far
greater than the number who are actually diagnosed with
an semantic deficits.
We do not wish to claim that there are no differences
between perceptual or functional object information. There
are many reasons to believe differences exist (at the very
least in terms of encoding) and that these difference may
impact on the ability to retrieve animate or inanimate
words. The model we present is very simple and explores a
single, simple mechanism that can produce category-
specific deficits as a results of random damage. The basic
point it makes is that one does not need to appeal to a
structured, or  separate semantic memories to account for
category-specific dissociations. McRae, De Sa and
Seidenberg (1997) make a related point. They suggest that
knowledge of animate objects is more susceptible to
diffuse damage in a unified memory because that
knowledge is encoded across a smaller set of more highly
correlated features units than knowledge of inanimate
objects.
Finally, the model suggests that more attention should be
paid to the input statistics of the categories used for testing
semantic deficits. A strong prediction of the model is that
— within a given subject — the variability of categories
should be a strong predictor of whether they are preserved
or not. Thus, within a subject showing semantic deficits,
the categories with broader definitions should be preserved
independently of whether they are animate, inanimate,
concrete, or abstract.
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